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In a note from 1875, Nietzsche states, ‘I must confess that Socrates 
is so close to me that I am almost always fighting a battle with him.’1 This 
confession highlights the enormous impact of the Platonic dialogues on 
Nietzsche’s thought. In his book, Plato and Nietzsche: Their 
Philosophical Art, Mark Anderson claims to diverge from the enormous 
scholarship that exists on the philosophy of these thinkers and present 
something new and refreshing by providing an examination of the 
Platonic and Nietzschean ideas that ‘can be joined in dialogue or debate’ 
(Preface). Anderson attempts to achieve this goal by arguing that Plato 
and Nietzsche are ‘thinker-artists’ (11) - that is, that they are ‘alike in 
being thinkers and artists simultaneously’ (46). The title itself is derived 
from the idea of being both a philosopher and an artist, rather than it 
being an attempt by the author to suggest that there is, or was, a form of 
techne called ‘philosophical art’ employed by these thinkers. 
Unfortunately, the book does not appear to present a unifying argument 
for this thesis. It can best be described as an ambitious collection of short 
discussions on various philosophical themes in the works of Nietzsche 
and Plato, such as ‘art, reason, ontology, epistemology, and ethics’ (9). 
                                                 
1 Nietzsche, Writings from the Early Notebooks. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009.) 6 [3], p. 209. 
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These discussions take place under broad chapter headings, with 
sometimes very little connecting the individual sections in a chapter. 
 
My initial judgement is that the book is well researched in terms of 
primary sources, minor bibliographical errors aside.2 It displays both a 
love for and familiarity with the key concepts and the two philosophers 
themselves. Anderson distinguishes between the historical, literary, and 
Platonic Socrates early on, and discusses the intricacies of attributing any 
idea in Plato’s works to Plato himself (13-15). While this will be familiar 
to any scholar working in the field, establishing the slippery nature of 
Socrates is important for the casual reader who may not have encountered 
this distinction before or understood the importance of it. Anderson’s 
background in Classics helps paint a well-rounded picture of Greek 
culture and society in some of the discussions of Plato, most noticeably in 
the short section ‘Kalokagatha’ (119-120) in Chapter 4, ‘Noble and 
Good’. This section explores the etymology and relevance of the term 
‘kalokagatha’, a portmanteau of kalos and agathos, or noble and good, a 
term used in reference to the aristocratic youth.3 Anderson deftly 
identifies its use in Platonic ethics in the Symposium and Republic. Much 
of the book is written with clarity and is enjoyable to read. However, it is 
difficult to construct a sustained critical engagement with a book that has 
neither a sustained nor critical argument to present. Due to this, the rest of 
the review will address some of the book’s specific flaws. 
 
In regards to the form, many sections of the book dissolve into pure 
exposition without making specific arguments. For instance, the section 
‘Forms’ (51-60) from Chapter 2, ‘Being’, reads like a generalist 
introduction to Plato. The specialist will be bored with such a broad 
retelling of basic tenets of Platonic philosophy. The exegetical work, 
whilst written in compelling clarity, will alienate scholars looking for an 
argument to contend with; the heavier parts of the section will drive away 
the layman. Another instance of this is the section ‘Historical 
                                                 
2 The publication of Greg Whitlock’s translation of Nietzsche’s lectures, ‘The Pre-
Platonic Philosophers’, is erroneously listed as 1995. This is, in fact, the 
publication date of part 2, volume 4, of Nietzsche Werke: Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, the critical German text upon which Whitlock’s translation is 
based. The correct date for Whitlock’s book is 2001. 
3 Cf. Herodotus 1.30. 
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Background’ (91-100) in Chapter 3, ‘Becoming’. The section explains a 
history of sceptical philosophical positions, from those of the ancient 
Greeks through to early modern philosophers such as Descartes, 
Montaigne, and Kant. The aim of the section is to produce a historical 
context for Nietzsche’s views on reality and truth. ‘It is a history of more 
than two thousand years,’ the author states, ‘but I shall strive for brevity 
by covering only the essentials.’ (91) The problem is both the lack of 
brevity – the section continues for nearly ten pages – and that there is no 
substantial connection made between these ten pages of historical 
background and Nietzsche’s work.  The section appears irrelevant, and 
again the sense of audience is confused.4 
 
The discussion of the Platonic view that tragedy is the furthest from 
reality (35), while worth mentioning as an interesting section of the book, 
could have benefitted from being directly contrasted to a Nietzschean 
view of tragedy. In fact, one issue is the lack of sustained and direct 
comparison between Plato and Nietzsche of the kind one would expect 
from a book focused on these two philosophers. 
 
The book is broadly historical, broadly exegetical (perhaps to a 
fault), and, in some places, broadly biographical. Whilst I would readily 
agree with Long’s formulation5 of the close link, for some philosophers, 
between life and thought, some of the biographical points made by 
Anderson are at best irrelevant and at worst imaginary. On 160-161, in a 
discussion of the tension between written and oral philosophy in the 
dialogues, Anderson makes ahistorical concessions for the sake of a 
dreamy passage about Plato sitting around writing at his desk and 
teaching in the Academy. He states, ‘We have no evidence that Plato 
                                                 
4 Anderson himself appears confused as to who his audience is – in the Preface, he 
states, ‘think of this book as a scholarly work not restricted to scholars.’ 
5 Made of the Hellenistic philosophers, but truly applicable to Nietzsche – that ‘there 
is a tendency […] to ignore biography, on the grounds that the philosophical 
historian should restrict attention to the formal analysis of moral concepts. In the 
case of philosophers in the Socratic tradition, life and thought are too closely 
related for such restriction to be defensible.’ Long, The Socratic Tradition: 
Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics. In: Robert Bracht Branham, Marie-Odile 
Goulet-Cazé, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.), p. 42. 
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taught in the Academy, but I am willing to allow that he did’, and the 
result is that the passage comes off as disingenuous.6 The whole section 
seems to be drifting towards an equally imaginary comparison with 
Nietzsche, as we see on 162; ‘This is the image of Plato I wish to take 
from his activities as a writer. It is an image he has in common with 
Nietzsche.’ 
  
The flow of the text is often interrupted by dreamy conjecture on 
the author’s part, such as in Chapter 5, ‘Plato as a Creative Writer’. On 
153, he conducts a ‘thought experiment’ concerning Axiothea, a female 
disciple of Plato. Axiothea is said to have found Plato’s Republic so 
thought-provoking that she left her home to dedicate herself to 
philosophy under the guise of a man. Anderson conducts his ‘thought 
experiment’ by asking the reader to imagine that it was really the 
Phaedrus that impelled Axiothea to pursue a life of philosophy. The result 
is a confused mishmash of history and imagination – it is not entirely 
clear why it is not conducted with the Republic, as to be accurate to the 
ancient anecdote, other than Anderson’s preference for the Phaedrus’ 
‘creative, poetic qualities’ – which comes across as question-begging in 
the construction of the ‘thought experiment’ itself when one looks at his 
results. 
  
Another issue is when Anderson makes arguments based solely in 
his personal opinion, such as his dismissal of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the 
Will to Power on 91; ‘There are those who make much of the “doctrine” 
of will to power, but to my mind Nietzsche is not at his best when writing 
about this subject’. This statement is made at the end of an extended 
discussion that does not lend itself to such a personal conclusion without 
further justification, nor does it provide any clue of how to interpret the 
quotation marks surrounding ‘doctrine’. 
 
The more concerning scholarly flaws are the following. There are 
some sections containing questionable interpretations of Plato and 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, such as the attribution to Nietzsche of an idea of 
                                                 
6 I would appeal to Geuss here, when he states that ‘accounts of the ancient ought to 
strive to avoid anachronism at any cost.’ Raymond Geuss, ‘Culture as Ideal and as 
Boundary’, Arion, 16.1 (2008), 133-154 (p. 135). 
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enduring selfhood on 90. Such a claim warrants more discussion than is 
allowed, and is, in fact, directly contradicted by a section of Human, All 
too Human that Anderson quotes on 5.7 Furthermore, the lack of reference 
to the literature from the broad field of Nietzsche studies on this subject 
lets the discussion down. Another example of the discussion being let 
down by a lack of reference to the literature appears on 14, where 
Anderson makes a dismissive claim about Xenophon. ‘[I]t is standard 
practice to dismiss or diminish Xenophon’s Socratic works on the ground 
that the man was just too simple, too shallow, to comprehend a mind as 
restless and original as Socrates’, (14) states Anderson. When the endnote 
at the end of this bold statement is followed to 186, we find not a 
reference to back up this claim that dismissing Xenophon is ‘standard 
practice’, but a quote from Nietzsche made in admiration of Xenophon’s 
works. Finally, the author’s assertion in the introduction that he makes no 
extended claims using Nietzsche’s unpublished texts8 is thrown out of the 
window by 81-85, where an entire section on Nietzsche, Heraclitus, and 
the theme of Becoming is constructed almost entirely from the 
unpublished lectures, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, and unpublished 
book draft, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. 
 
In conclusion, I think that this book is best suited to a reader largely 
unfamiliar with the works of Plato and Nietzsche, due to the lengths that 
Anderson goes to in both explaining and contextualising many of the 
most important themes in their works. Much of the book would make a 
good introductory secondary text for students. However, between the lack 
of unifying argument and the other problems as outlined above, the 
scholar may not find this work as useful.   
                                                 
7 ‘[Nietzsche] suggests […] to resist “treating ourselves as fixed, stable, single 
individuals” (HH 618).’ Plato and Nietzsche, p. 5. 
8 ‘I should point out that I do not base any significant claims exclusively on 
Nietzsche’s notes.’ Plato and Nietzsche, p. 8. 
